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Monetary policy reactionThe exchange rate is an important part of the transmission mechanism in the determination of monetary policy
becausemovements in the exchange rate have significant effect on themacroeconomy. It can be difficult tomea-
sure the reaction ofmonetary policy to themovements of the exchange rate, due to the simultaneous response of
monetary policy to the exchange rate and the possibility that both variables respond to several other variables.
This study addresses these problems by using an identification method based on the heteroscedasticity in the
high-frequency data. The results in this paper suggest that the ECB systematically responds to exchange rate
movements but that quantitative effects are small. Such a significant but small reaction coefficient seems consis-
tent with the hypothesis that the central banks do not target the fluctuations in the exchange rate but consider
them only to the extent they impact on the expected inflation and output path.
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.“… it is clearly not opportune to introduce asset prices into a monetary
policy rule the central bank should commit to or in the central bank's
reaction function.” Jean-Claude Trichet (2002).1. Introduction
There are three main channels through which the exchange rate af-
fects the macroeconomy. Appreciation lowers real GDP because of ex-
penditure switching, and further, it lowers inflation because the price
of imported goods does not increase as rapidly with the appreciation
of the currency (Taylor, 2001). Secondly, changes in the exchange rate
also generate wealth effects that may have a significant impact on con-
sumption and investment, both of which are components of aggregate
demand. Because of households' inter-temporal smoothing behavior, a
direct decrease in net wealthmay lead to a drop in consumption. Lastly,
depreciation can increase the value of collateral which may reduce
agents' external financing constraints and enhance final spending in
accordance with the “broad credit channel”.
Because of these important impacts of the exchange rate on aggre-
gate demand, output and inflation, which are components of policy
rule, theremay be a relationship between exchange rates andmonetaryRefet Gurkaynak, Bedri Kamil
at the Bilkent University.policy rules. Themain objective of this paper is tomeasure the response
of monetary policy to the exchange rate in the Euro area and try to
determine the role of the exchange rate in monetary policy.
Although themonetary policy response to exchange rates has large-
ly been studied in the empirical literature, there are some difficulties in
measuring this effect. To begin with, while monetary policy is affected
by changes in exchange rate, the exchange rate also responds to the
changes in the monetary policy; i.e. there is a simultaneous response
of both variables to each other, so, the direction of causality is difficult
to establish. Moreover, there are other unobservable common factors
affecting both short term interest rates and exchange rates, such as
macroeconomic news and change in the risk preference. Hence, mea-
surement is complicated due to the endogeneity problem and the pos-
sibility of relevant variables being omitted.
There is considerable empirical literature on the exchange rate in a
policy rule. However, general empirical studies ignore the endogeneity
problem and eliminate numerous factors affecting interest rates and ex-
change rates. Most of them use the least square, two stages least square,
VAR and IV approaches to estimate the response of interest rates. But
these approaches cannot appropriately solve the problems mentioned
above. Least square results are strongly biased; there are no obvious re-
strictions to identifymonetary policy shocks in theVAR framework; and
lastly, it is hard to find a proper instrument which affects the exchange
ratewithout affecting interest rates. In this study, to address these prob-
lems, we apply a new identification approach developed by Rigobon
(2003a), which argues that the response of monetary policy is based
1 The equations used in this section are inspired by RS (2003b).
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the importance of the exchange rate shocks relative to the monetary
policy shocks thereby estimated changes in variance–covariancematrix
between shocks make measure the responsiveness of monetary policy
to exchange rate possible. Heteroscedasticity based identification is a
relatively newmethod and this paper presents the first study to employ
this approach to measure policy reactions to the exchange rate move-
ments for ECB data.
The impact of asset prices on the conduct ofmonetary policy debates
has increased over the last decade. Taylor (2001) argues that a mone-
tary policy rule that reacts directly to the exchange rate, as well as to in-
flation and output, sometimesworksworse than policy rules that do not
react directly to the exchange rate. However, Bernanke and Gertler
(1999, 2001) argue that monetary policy should react to asset price
movements only to the extent warranted by their impact on expected
inflation. On similar lines, Rigobon and Sack (2003) find that the Federal
Reserve reacts significantly to changes in the stock market. Their find-
ings suggest that policy-makers are reacting to asset price movements
to the extent warranted by their implications for the economy. In the
context of discussing the impact of asset prices on monetary policy,
Jean-Claude Trichet, governor of the ECB from 2003 to 2011, stated
that financial indicators (stock prices, housing prices, exchange rates)
are also analyzed in depth and they are assessed in the context of main-
taining price stability over the medium term: the ECB does not react to
their signals unless price stability is endangered. Conversely, the empir-
ical findings of this paper indicate that the ECB responds systematically
to the exchange rate movements and the reaction coefficient is signifi-
cantly negative but small. Since the estimated policy reaction coefficient
is within reasonable range of the magnitude, it appears that the ECB
reacts to exchange rate fluctuations only to offset the expected impact
of exchange rate shocks on inflation and output.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the rele-
vant studies in the literature and the contribution of this paper.
Section 3 discusses the problems of simultaneous equations and omit-
ted variables and demonstrates why other widely used identification
methods are inappropriate in this context. Also, this section describes
the identification approach based on the heteroscedasticity of exchange
rate shocks. Section 4 gives information about the data and contains the
empirical results. It also argues the policy implications of empirical
results. Section 5 concludes with a summary.
2. Background
The movements in the exchange rate in monetary policy rules are
discussed in the theoretical and empirical literature. Ball (1999, 2002)
argues for the role of exchange rate in inflation targeting frameworks
for closed and open economies. He found that pure inflation targeting
without considering the exchange rate is dangerous, because it causes
large fluctuations in output. The effect of exchange rates on inflation
through import prices is the fastest channel and so inflation targeting
implies that it is used aggressively. However, large shifts in the ex-
change rate create oscillations in output. Ball found that, holding the
standard deviation of output relative to potential output constant (at
1.4%), the interest-rate rule that reacts to the exchange rate as well as
to output and inflation reduces the standard deviation of the inflation
rate around the inflation target from 2.0% to 1.9% (Ball, 1999 p. 134)
compared with a rule that reacts only to inflation and output. But this
improvement is small. He suggests that policy rules in open economies
should be modified to include information about the exchange rate. He
uses a policy instrument — namely Monetary Condition Index (MCI), a
weighted average of the interest rate and the exchange rate. Central
banks should choose “long-run inflation targeting”: a measure of infla-
tion adjusted to filter out the effects of exchange rate.
Taylor (2001) examines the exchange rate as a candidate for a mon-
etary policy rule for the ECB in the form suggested in Ball's (1999) stud-
ies. He argues that amonetary policy rulewhich responds directly to theexchange rate, as well as to inflation and output, sometimes works
worse than policy rules without reference to the exchange rate. In his
2002 study, however, Taylor indicates that the monetary policy in
open economies is different from the policy in closed economies. Cen-
tral banks seem averse to significant variability in exchange rates.
They should target ameasure of inflation that removes the transitory ef-
fects of exchange rate fluctuations as Ball (2002) suggests and they
should also contain the exchange rate in their policy rules.
On the other hand, the results of empirical studies focusing on policy
rules with exchange rates are quite controversial with theoretical studies
mentioned above. Clarida et al. (1998) show that monetary policy re-
sponds to the exchange rate in industrial countries, but the magnitude
of the monetary policy reaction is small. Along the same lines, Osawa
(2006) estimatesmonetary policy reaction functions to examinewhether
monetary policy responds to fluctuations in the exchange rate under the
inflation-targeting regimes in Korea, Thailand and the Philippines using
two stage least squares and ordinary least squares (OLS). He finds no
evidence that monetary policy reacts to the exchange rate. Inclusion of
the Asian financial crisis period overestimates the monetary policy reac-
tion because exchange rate and interest rate are fluctuatedwidely during
the crisis period. For the same countries, Sek (2008) apply a GMM and
structural VAR to investigate the relationship between exchange rates
and monetary policy. The results of these approaches are consistent
with each other, i.e. the monetary policy reactions in Philippines and
Korea do not response significantly to exchange rate directly. But they
only find a strong reaction of policy in Thailand to exchange rate fluctua-
tions in the pre-crisis period. The results in these empirical papers are in
accord with the results in Ball (1999) and Taylor (2001).
On the other hand, Filosa (2001) finds that many central banks in
emerging countries react strongly to exchange rate movements, al-
though changes in themonetary policy regimemake it difficult to assess
the relative importance placed by countries on inflation control and ex-
ternal equilibrium. Mohanty and Klau (2005) also find a strong re-
sponse of monetary policy to exchange rates for Asian countries by
focusing on quarterly data between 1995 and 2002. Lastly, Frömmel
and Schobert (2006) estimate a Taylor rule for six European countries.
They point out that the exchange rate plays an important role in the
monetary policy during thefixed exchange rate regimeperiods. Howev-
er, this impact disappears after the introduction of flexible regimes.
Most of the empirical studies in the literature do not address the
endogeneity problem and the numerous factors affecting interest rates
and exchange rates simultaneously. Therefore, they cannot appropriate-
ly separate out the response of monetary policy to the exchange rate.
This paper aims to come up with unbiased estimates with the
heteroscedasticity based identification approach.3. Statement of the problem and methodology1
In this paper, in order to overcome endogeneity between exchange
rates and interest rates, we use an identification method suggested by
Rigobon (2003a). This method relies on the heteroscedasticity in inter-
est rates and exchange rates to identify the monetary policy reaction to
the exchange rate. Shifts in importance of exchange rate shocks relative
tomonetary policy shocks change the covariance between the exchange
rate and policy rate. It allows us to identify the interest rate reaction to
fluctuations in exchange rate based on changes in covariance.
The data suggest that shifts in the variance of shocks affect the corre-
lation between changes in interest rates and exchange rates. Fig. 1
shows the correlation between daily changes in the exchange rate and
daily changes in the short-term interest rate. Note that the correlation
varies butmostly becomes negative during periods in which the volatil-
ity of exchange rates increased.
Fig. 1. Comovements in exchange rate and interest rates.
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terest rate and exchange rate, is conducted as in Rigobon and Sack
(2003). The dynamic structural equations for the short-term interest
rate and the exchange rate are written as follows:
it ¼ βet þ θxt þ γzt þ εt ð1Þ
et ¼ αit þ ϕxt þ zt þ ηt ð2Þ
where it is the short-term interest rate, et is the exchange rate and zt is
the unobserved variables.2 The variable xt captures observable shocks
and zt summarizes some unobserved shocks affecting the exchange
rate and the interest rate such as changes in risk preference and liquidity
shocks. Eq. (1) is the high frequency monetary policy reaction function
for ECB.3 Eq. (2) represents the exchange rate equation,whichmeasures
the response of the exchange rate to the interest rate and other shocks.
εt is the monetary policy shock, and ηt is the exchange rate shock. The
residuals εt, ηt andunobserved shock zt are assumed to be serially uncor-
related and to be uncorrelated with each other.
Eqs. (1) and (2) cannot be estimated directly, because of the
endogeneity between it and et and because of unobservable variable zt.










where the reduced form residuals are given by
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The covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals is




β þ γð Þ2σ2z þ β2σ2η þ σ2ε 1þ αγð Þ β þ γð Þσ2z þ βσ2η þ ασ2ε
: 1þ αγð Þ2σ2z þ σ2η þ α2σ2ε
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:
ð6Þ2 The coefficient on zt in the exchange rate equation normalized to 1.
3 When xt contains inflation and output gap as observable variables, Eq. (1) would be a
sort of modified Taylor rule.The covariance matrix only provides three moments–two variances
and a covariance while in matrix Ω but there are six unknowns: α, β, γ,
σz2, ση2 and σε2. Hence, these restrictions are not enough to achieve identi-
fication and recover the structural form parameters. Heteroscedasticity
in the reduced form residuals provides additional restrictions to the sys-
tem represented by (5). A shift to a regime with a different covariance
matrix provides three new equations and the new regime also adds
three unknown parameters σz2, ση2 and σε2.
Within this framework, assuming that themonetary policy shocks εt
are homoscedastic ensure an identification. As iswell known, the gener-
al characteristic of macroeconomic data is heteroscedastic and mone-
tary policy shocks are heteroscedastic as well. Since our subsample
stands for the non-policy dates (days immediately preceding the mon-
etary policy committeemeeting days), we assume that monetary policy
shocks εt, are homoscedastic across regimes. The assumption of con-
stant monetary policy shocks is not very restrictive, because of the fact
that the variance of the interest rate consists of varying ση2 and σz2. This
implies it is not homoscedastic and it is based on varying unobserved
shocks and exchange rate shocks through different regimes.
Under the assumption of homoscedastic policy shocks, a shift in the
covariance matrix provides three new equations but only two new un-
known parameters. Moreover, we assume: α, β and γ are stable across
the covariance regimes.4 Under these assumptions at least three differ-
ent regimes for the covariance matrix are required to identify that the
parameter of interest is β, the reaction of the short-term rate to the ex-
change rate. In the case of three regimes there are nine equations and
ten unknownparameters, and it is enough only for partial identification.
For each new regime indexed by the subscript i= 1,2,3, the covariance




β þ γð Þ2σ2i;z þ β2σ2i;η þ σ2ε 1þ αγð Þ β þ γð Þσ2i;z þ βσ2i;η þ ασ2ε
: 1þ αγð Þ2σ2i;z þ σ2i;η þ α2σ2ε
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: ð7Þ
The parameter β must solve the following system of equations (see
the Appendix A for the full solution):
θ ¼ ΔΩ21;12−ΔΩ21;22
ΔΩ21;11−ΔΩ21;12
ð8ÞIn themacroeconomics literature, VARs are often estimated across samples that surely
exhibit heteroscedasticity, without allowing shifts in parameters. Similarly, in the finance
literature, many studies that even explicitly allow for variation in volatility, including
GARCH models, often require that the parameters of the underlying equation are fixed
(Rigobon and Sack, 2004).
Fig. 2. T-Bill rate, EONIA and MROs.
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ΔΩ −ΔΩ ð9ÞTable 1
Descriptive statistics and correlations.
EONIA MROs T-Bill
Mean 2.77 2.80 2.67
Median 2.79 2.75 2.71
Maximum 5.06 4.75 5.21
Minimum 0.34 1.00 0.13
Std. dev. 1.25 1.09 1.28
Correlation EONIA MROs T-Bill
EONIA 1.00 – –31;11 31;12
where ΔΩj1 = ΔΩj ΔΩ1 is the change in the covariance matrix from re-
gime j to regime 1 for j = 2,3. ΔΩj1,kl is the k and l element in matrix j.
When there are more than three regimes for the variance–covariance
matrix, any three can be used to arrive at a solution to Eqs. (8) and (9). If
themodel is correctly specified, the estimates of β should be the same for
any three regimes.We implement the standard test of the overidentifying
restrictions of the model. A rejection of the overidentifying restriction
test implies that the homoscedastic policy shocks are violated or the pa-
rameters of equations are not stable across the regimes. Also, if the pa-
rameter β is not constant the formulation of Rigobon and Sack (2003)
may not capture the nonlinearity.
4. Data and empirical evidence
4.1. Data
In this studywe use Germany's three-month Treasury bill rate as the
short-term interest rate and euro–dollar exchange rate. Treasury bill
rates (T-Bill) are not available for the European Central Bank. Therefore,
we use the three-month T-Bill of Deutsche Bundesbank as the short-
term interest rate. One could argue that instead of the T-Bill, ECB inter-
est rate on the main refinancing operations (MROs), or the Euro over-
night index average (EONIA) would be more appropriate instruments
for the short-term interest rate. A graph is plotted to show the relation-
ship between three-month T-Bill rate of Germany, EONIA andMROs for
1999:1–2010:09 period. As shown in Fig. 2, the rates are very closely re-
lated and move together. Furthermore, descriptive statistics and corre-
lations are calculated and reported in Table 1. The average of the
MROs is slightly higher but less volatile than that of T-Bill and EONIA.
The correlation between the T-Bill rate and MROs is approximately
0.97 while it became 0.99 in the pre-crisis period. The correlation be-
tween EONIA and MROs is also strong (0.99). A visual description and
the results of correlations make it readily possible to verify that T-Bill
rates may be used as a proxy for ECB policy action.
T-Bill is one of themost liquid securities at shortmaturities and it ad-
justs daily according to changes in expectation of monetary policy over
the following term, while MROs are adjusted approximately once a
month. 5 The reason for using T-Bill rate instead of EONIA is that volatil-
ity in interest rates is an important factor for our identification approach
and a relatively poor way to define heteroscedasticity of the shocks.5 Decisions on the euro area policy rates are taken during meetings of the Governing
Council. 35 policy decisions were taken between 1999:01 and 2010:09.Our empirical investigation relies on daily and monthly data cover-
ing the period from April 1999 to September 2010. The daily data are
used for the following reasons. Firstly, the daily data allows us to define
the heteroscedasticity of the shocks more accurately. Secondly, the li-
quidity in the money market rate can be affected by central banks on
a daily basis. Lastly, T-Bills tend to anticipatemonetary policy decisions;
monetary policy can affect the daily movements of T-Bills even if policy
rate decisions take place less often (Bohl et al., 2007).
In this framework, we assume that monetary policy shocks are ho-
moscedastic. Therefore, the related sample stands for the non-policy
dates (days immediately preceding the monetary policy committee
meeting days) and the holidays and weekends are removed. Euro–
dollar exchange rates were obtained from the ECB website and
Bundesbank staff provided the T-Bill rates.
The data are plotted in levels in Fig. 3. As can be seen in the graph,
there is a negative relationship between the short term interest rate
and the exchange rate.
4.2. Estimates for widely used methodologies
Formally, the dynamics of the short-term interest rates and the
exchange rate are written as follows:
Δit ¼ βΔet þ φxt þ εt ð10Þ
Δet ¼ αΔit þ ϕxt þ ηt ð11Þ
where it is the T-Bill rate, et is the change exchange rate, εt is the mone-
tary policy shock, and ηt is the exchange rate shock. As Rigobon and Sack
(2003b) point out, control for observable macroeconomic shocks is re-
quired. We add lags in the exchange rate as an exogenous variable, asMROs 0.99a 1.00 –
T-Bill 0.98a 0.97a 1.00
a Indicates significance at the 1% level.
Fig. 3. T-Bill rate and exchange rate.
67İ. Demir / Economic Modelling 39 (2014) 63–70wells as lags in the short term interest rate. The variable xt is a vector
containing 5 lags of the exchange rate and the interest rate.
As mentioned before, due to the endogeneity problem Eqs. (8) and
(9) cannot be estimated and only reduced form of these equations can
be estimated. We are interested in the impact of changes in the ex-
change rate on the short term interest rate. ECB policy reaction function
can be estimated under inappropriate assumption of no simultaneous
response of the exchange rate to the interest rate. The estimated results
of the policy reaction function (Eq. (10)) are summarized in Table 2.
The changes in the exchange rate do not have a large impact on the
interest rate. The estimated coefficient (β) is insignificant and negative,
which is consistent with ECB not being explicit about responding to a
change in the exchange rate. In that case ignoring the endogeneity,
heteroscedasticity and unobservability of common shock problems
causes a strong biased estimated policy reaction.
In order to describe the movements in interest rates, a large litera-
ture has developed on estimatingmonetary policy rules. Monetary pol-
icy can be described by a rule based on contemporaneous inflation,
output gap and lagged interest rate as follows:
it ¼ 1−ρð Þ β0 þ βyyt þ βππt
 
þ ρit−1 ð12Þ
where πt is the inflation rate, yt is the output gap, and it is the policy rate.
Consumer price inflation in the euro area is measured by the
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). In line with e.g. Clarida
et al. (1998), we take the industrial production index for the euro area
and calculate the deviation of log output from its Hodrick–Prescott filter
trend in order to identify the output gap. Table 2 shows the estimated
parameters from this rule. This table indicates that the ECB does not re-
spond to the variations in inflation, but responds significantly to the
output gap. Because the exchange rate impacts on the path of output
and inflation as discussed before, the rule needs to be modified to in-
clude information about the exchange rate. Suppose that exchangeTable 2
Response of daily changes in short-term interest rate to changes in exchange rate (ignor-
ing endogeneity).
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic
Exchange rate −0.13 0.08 −1.50
Sample: 1999 to 2010 Included obs.: 2907
R-Squared: 0.20 Durbin–Watson stat.: 2.00
S.D. dependent var.: 0.036 S.E. of regression: 0.36
Regression includes a constant and five lags of the interest rate and exchange rate.
The data are daily, and the sample runs from January 1999 to October 2010.rate, et, has been taken into account in formulating monetary policy
as in:
it ¼ γ0 þ γyyt þ γππt þ γeΔet þ ρit−1 ð13Þ
where γ0 = (1 − ρ)β0, γy = (1 − ρ)βy, γπ = (1 − ρ)βπ and γe =
(1 − ρ)βe. An estimate of the Eq. (13) using OLS indicates that themea-
sured reaction of the interest rate to the variation in exchange rate is
significant, and increases the output gap coefficient very slightly.
The empirical literature has adopted instrumental variables or VAR
approaches to address the endogeneity problem arising from the con-
temporaneous regressors. Following Gerlach and Smets (2000), we
use current inflation, current output gap, the lag of policy rates and ex-
change rates as instruments. The results in Table 3 show that the policy
response to the exchange rate is positive but not significantly from zero.
The results of IV estimation are sensitive to the choice of instrumental
variables, and it is hard to find a suitable instrument which affects the
exchange rate without affecting interest rates. Rigobon and Sack
(2003) claims that using this sort of weak instruments leads to biased
estimates. Lastly, we apply the structural VAR method to estimate a si-
multaneous four equations system using the output gap, inflation, the
exchange rate and the policy rate. The structural VAR system is
expressed as:
AXT ¼ ΓXT−1 þ ut ð14Þ
where Xt′= [yt, πt, et, it] is stationary and structural error ut ~ i.i.d N(0,D).
Unfortunately this equation system cannot be estimated directly due to
the identification issue. Additional information is required to identify
the structural parameters and shocks. We impose restrictions on the
contemporaneous matrix, A, following Cholesky decomposition and
setmatrixD as diagonal.Matrix A becomes lower triangular and the sys-
tem becomes just identified.6 The estimate results are presented in the
last column of Table 3. The results are essentially same as the instru-
mental variable estimation results. The response of the policy rate to
the exchange rate is positive and insignificant.
The problem with Cholesky decomposition is that a triangular ma-
trix A does not allow the contemporaneous relationship between ex-
change rate and interest rate. Traditional identification assumptions
are used in the appliedmacroeconomics literature but are not appropri-
ate in this context, because imposing restriction in one direction but not6 Cholesky decomposition assumes that shocks are propagated in the order of output
gap, inflation, exchange rate and interest rate. In this ordering yt is only affected by its
own shock;πt is affected contemporaneously by its own shocks and yt shocks; et is affected
by its own shocks, yt, πt shocks; it is affected by its own shocks and three other shocks.
Table 3
Monetary policy rule.
Coefficient Without exchange rate (OLS) Including exchange rate (OLS) Including exchange rate (IV) Including exchange rate (SVAR)
γ0 0.60 (0.20) 0.60 (0.20) 0.56 (0.23) 0.14 (0.07)
γy 0.09 (0.02) 0.10 (0.03) 0.09 (0.02) 0.05 (0.01)
γπ −0.14 (0.09) −0.14 (0.09) −0.12 (0.11) 0.07 (0.04)
γe – 0.45 (1.15) 1.17 (1.22) 0.41 (0.36)
ρ 0.86 (0.05) 0.86 (0.05)
Standard errors shown in parenthesis.
68 İ. Demir / Economic Modelling 39 (2014) 63–70in the other is not realistic.7 Obvious long-run restrictions are not avail-
able to differentiate monetary policy shocks from exchange rate shocks.
Overall, applying commonly-used identification techniques or in-
strumental variables cannot effectively solve the endogeneity between
interest rate and exchange rate or the omitted variable bias problem,
as discussed before. In this paper, we use a relatively newmethodology
based on the heteroscedasticity of the error terms to identify the policy
rate response to the exchange rate.8 Many different overidentification tests could be performed and I have applied the
GMM-overidentification test. The overidentifying restrictions are tested with the follow-
ing test statistic: q̂ ¼ m βð Þ′V−1m βð Þwhere V−1 is the variance of the difference of the es-
timators. Note, however, that this approach does not test the assumption that the three4.3. Identification through heteroscedasticity estimates
The initial step is determining thedifferent regimes for the variance–
covariance matrix of the reduced form shocks to monetary policy and
the exchange rate. Firstly, Eq. (3) is estimated by VAR and computes
the residuals. We define four regimes: one is that both interest rates
and exchange rate shocks have high volatility, one is that both shocks
have low volatility, and in the other two regimes in which one has
low and the other has high volatility. Periods of high volatility are de-
fined as when the thirty-day rolling variance of the residual from VAR
is more than one standard deviation above its average as identified in
Rigobon and Sack (2003). The four variance–covariance regimes are
illustrated in Table 4.
Table 3 reveals that the covariance between the interest rate and ex-
change rate varies with shifts in their variances and it becomes negative
when the volatility of exchange rate rises. These different regimes of the
variance–covariance matrix are chosen arbitrarily. As described in pre-
vious sections, the monetary policy reaction to the exchange rate
could be identified with at least three regimes. I treat Eqs. (8) and (9)
as moment conditions and solve for the parameters using GMM. Esti-
mates of themonetary policy reaction coefficientβ for daily andmonth-
ly data are listed in Table 5.
For the daily time series the results indicate a negative policy
response to the exchange rate, with an estimated coefficient β of
−0.199. By employing a more appropriate identification approach
based on heteroscedasticity, a significant negative reaction of monetary
policy to the exchange rate is found. This is themajor result of the paper.
The point estimate for the response coefficient β shows that a 1 point
rise in the exchange rate tends to decrease the three-month interest
rate by around 20 basis points. Similar results are obtained when the
other regimes are used to estimate the parameter. The estimates of
monetary policy reactions resulting from other regimes are consistently
low and close to one another.
In order to test whether the policy reaction to the exchange rate de-
pends on the frequency of the data, we estimate the same system using
lower frequency data. The results formonthly data, shown in Table 4, in-
dicate that the estimated response of monetary policy is negative and
larger than high frequency data. In addition, we consider a case of ran-
dom 3-month rolling regimes instead of the thirty-day rolling regimes
and the results are largely similar. Even so, the resulting estimates for
low frequency and different identification regimes are still small in
magnitude and support the hypothesis that the ECB does not react to
exchange rate movements too much.7 Short-run restrictions, long-run and sign restrictions are used in the literature to iden-
tify the VAR models.There are four regimes and only three regimes are sufficient for
identification, so the parameter is overidentified. Therefore, we
also test whether the β parameter is stable across different regimes
and the homoscedasticity assumption of the policy shocks is valid.
The result of the overidentification test shows that all assumptions of
the heteroscedasticity based identification approach are valid. The hy-
pothesis of parameter constancy cannot be rejected for both daily and
monthly time series except in two cases (i.e. estimates under regimes
1, 3, 4 for daily data and regimes 1, 2, 4 for monthly data).8
There is a big debate among economists about the role of asset prices
in the conduct of monetary policy. Cecchetti et al. (2000) find strong
support for including stock prices in the central bank's policy rule.
They argue that reacting to asset priceswill allow central banks to stabi-
lize inflation and output more successfully. In contrast Bernanke and
Gertler (2001) claim that central banks should not react to asset prices,
except insofar as they affect the expected inflation. In this regard Jean
Claude Trichet (2002) said that “ it is clearly not opportune to introduce
asset prices into a monetary policy rule the central bank should commit
to or in the central bank's reaction function.”9 According to him, a wide
range of economic and financial indicators (stock prices, housing prices,
exchange rates) is also analyzed in depth and their assessment is made
in the context of maintaining price stability over the medium term. The
ECB does not react to their signals unless price stability is endangered.
Trichet summarized that if monetary policy does not react directly to
asset price developments, it clearly has to take into consideration all
the consequences of these developments on the aggregate economy
and expectations, since they may at some point affect price
developments.
In line with this debate the empirical exercises of this paper are
intended only to measure the policy response to the exchange rate.
We are not primarily concernedwith determiningwhether such a reac-
tion is optimal.We find a significant, negative and small response of the
policy reaction coefficient, although theprimary objective of ECB is price
stability and it is not explicit about responding to the exchange rate. But
because the estimated policy reaction coefficient is within reasonable
distance from the magnitude, it appears that the ECB responds to ex-
change rate movements only to offset the expected passing-through
of exchange rate shocks to inflation and output. The empirical evidence
of this paper supports that the ECB should monitor fluctuations in
exchange rate rather than targeting.
5. Conclusion
Relatively little empirical evidence is available that estimates the im-
pact of exchange rates on the conduct of monetary policy. Estimating
the response ofmonetary policy to changes in the exchange rate is com-
plicated by the endogeneity problem and the fact that both interestshocks are uncorrelated. For a general treatment, see Harris and Matyas (1999) and
Newey and McFadden (1994).
9 The full speech of Jean-Claude Trichet, governor of ECB from 2003 to 2011, is available
at http://www.bis.org/review/r020426a.pdf.
Table 4
Variance–covariance matrix of regimes.
Variance of monetary policy Variance of exchange rate Covariance
Daily data
Regime 1 0.001209 0.000123 −0.000007
Regime 2 0.000082 0.000014 0.000001
Regime 3 0.002276 0.000066 −0.000067
Regime 4 0.010113 0.000053 0.000161
Monthly data
Regime 1 0.002135 0.000087 −0.000088
Regime 2 0.000488 0.000017 0.000009
Regime 3 0.002171 0.000074 −0.000106
Regime 4 0.007657 0.000043 0.000024
High variance regimes are in bold.
69İ. Demir / Economic Modelling 39 (2014) 63–70rates and the exchange rate react to many other variables. This paper
provides new empirical findings on the impact of exchange rate move-
ments on interest rates using daily and monthly data from the ECB be-
tween 1999 and 2010.
Using themethod of identification through heteroscedasticity devel-
oped byRigobon (2003a), the reaction of policy to the exchange rate can
be measured effectively when there are shifts in the variance of ex-
change rate shocks. This methodology takes into account the simulta-
neous response of both the interest rate and exchange rate to each
other and common factors affecting both variables which widely used
approaches in the literature might not be addressed.
The empirical results indicate that monetary policy reacts signifi-
cantly to changes in the exchange rate, with a 1 point rise (fall) in the
exchange rate increasing the interest rate by 20 basis points. For daily
andmonthly time series, the exchange rate has a negative but small im-
pact on the interest rate of ECB between 1999 and 2010. Such a signifi-
cant but small policy reaction coefficient implies that ECB consider the
fluctuations in exchange rate but not to target them. This is consistent
with the suggestion that central banks may respond to the movements
in asset prices only to the extent that they impact on the macro-
economy, since the exchange rate affects the expected inflation and out-
put path as Taylor (2001) suggests.
Appendix A. Details on methodology
In the present Appendix A, we provide the solution to the identifica-
tion problem mention in Section 3 and show how parameter β solves
the system when at least three different regimes are given.





β þ γð Þ2Δσ2j1;z þ β2Δσ2j1;η 1þ αγð Þ β þ γð ÞΔσ2j1;z þ βΔσ2j1;η
: 1þ αγð Þ2Δσ2j1;z þ Δσ2j1;η
" #
where Δσj1,z2 = Δσj,z2 − Δσ1,z2 and Δσj1,η2 = Δσj,η2 − Δσ1,η2 for j = {2,3}.
Since the σε2 is homoscedastic and α, β and γ parameters are stable,
the change in covariance matrix does not depend on the variance of
monetary policy shocks. These two changes in the covariance matrices,
ΔΩ21 and ΔΩ31, form a system of six nonlinear equations with sevenTable 5
Estimates of ECB's reaction to exchange rate under alternative regimes.
Regimes 1, 2, 3 Regimes 1, 2, 4 Regimes 1, 3, 4 Regimes 2, 3, 4
Daily data
Coefficient −0.19999 −0.27327 −0.27117 −0.15588
Std. deviation 0.00901 0.00615 0.02328 0.01639
Monthly data
Coefficient −0.32621 −0.29742 −0.51676 −0.28575
Std. deviation 0.00014 0.00113 0.02471 0.00007unknowns, but in which β is just identified. To see this, rewrite the co-
variance matrix as:
Ω j1 ¼ 1
1−αβð Þ2
ωz; j þ β2Δσ2j1;η θωz;2 þ βΔσ2j1;η
: θ2ωz;2 þ Δσ2j1;η
" #
θ ¼ 1þ αγ
β þ γ ωz; j ¼ β þ γð Þ
2Δσ2j1;z:
The six equations that result can be written as follows:
ωz;2 þ β2Δσ221;η ¼ 1−αβð Þ2:ΔΩ21;11
θωz;2 þ βΔσ221;η ¼ 1−αβð Þ2:ΔΩ21;12
θ2ωz;2 þ Δσ221;η ¼ 1−αβð Þ2:ΔΩ21;22
ωz;3 þ β2Δσ231;η ¼ 1−αβð Þ2:ΔΩ31;11
θωz;3 þ βΔσ231;η ¼ 1−αβð Þ2:ΔΩ31;12
θ2ωz;3 þ Δσ231;η ¼ 1−αβð Þ2:ΔΩ31;22
where ΔΩj1,kl is the k and l element of the j matrix. If θβ≠ 1, which as-






which is a system of two equations with two unknowns (θ,β). Solving
this system of Eqs. (8) and (9), the parameter of interest β, and estimate
for combining θ are obtained. Rigobon and Sack (2003) selection criteria
which are also applied in this study are as follows: if the two roots have
different signs, they select the positive one. If they have the same sign,
they choose the smaller in absolute value. Substitute the Eq. (8) in
Eq. (9) below the quadratic equation obtained in terms of β





The quadratic equation has a real solution and after some algebra it
can be written as follows:
1þ αγð Þdβ2− 2β þ αγβ þ γð Þdβ þ β β þ γð Þd
where
d ¼ σ2z;3σ2η;2−σ2z;3σ2η;1−σ2z;1σ2η;2−σ2z;2σ2η;3 þ σ2z;1σ2η;3 þ σ2z;2:








Hence, we are able to estimate consistently β as long as we choose
the right solution of the quadratic form and we have at least three re-
gimes for the covariance matrix.
References
Ball, L., 1999. Policy Rules for Open Economies. In: Taylor, John B. (Ed.), Monetary Policy
Rules. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Ball, L., 2002. Policy Rules and External Shocks. Working Papers Central Bank of Chile, 82.
Central Bank of Chile.
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., 1999. Monetary policy and asset price volatility. Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City. Econ. Rev. LXXXIV, 17–51.
70 İ. Demir / Economic Modelling 39 (2014) 63–70Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., 2001. Should central banks respond to movements in asset
prices? Am. Econ. Rev. Pap. Proc. XCI, 253–257.
Bohl, Martin T., Siklos, P.L., Werner, T., 2007. Do central banks react to the stock market?
The case of the Bundesbank. J. Bank. Financ. 31, 719–733.
Cecchetti, S., Genberg, H., Lipsky, J., Wadhwani, S., 2000. Asset Prices and Central Bank
Policy. International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies, London.
Clarida, R., Gali, J., Gertler, M., 1998. Monetary policy rules in practice: some international
evidence. Eur. Econ. Rev. 42, 1033–1067.
Filosa, R., 2001. Monetary policy rules in some mature emerging economies. BIS Pap. 8,
39–68.
Frömmel, M., Schobert, F., 2006. Monetary Policy Rules in Central and Eastern Europe.
Discussion paper. Hannover University, p. 341.
Gerlach, S., Smets, F., 2000. MCIs and Monetary Policy. European Economic Review, Vol.
44(9). Elsevier, pp. 1677–1700 (October).
Harris, D., Matyas, L., 1999. Introduction to the Generalized Method of Moments Estima-
tion. In: Matyas, L. (Ed.), Generalized Method of Moments Estimation. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Mohanty, M.S., Klau, M., 2005. Monetary Policy Rules in Emerging Market Economies: Is-
sues and Evidence. In: Rolf, J., Vinhas de Souza, Lucio, Langhammer, Rolf J. (Eds.), Mon-
etary Policy and Macroeconomic Stabilization in Latin America. The Kiel Institute.
Newey, W., McFadden, D., 1994. Large Sample Estimation and Hypothesis Testing. In:
Engle, R., McFadden, D. (Eds.), Handbook of Econometrics. IV, pp. 2113–2247.Osawa, Naoto, 2006. Monetary Policy Responses to the Exchange Rate: Empirical
Evidence from Three East Asian Inflation-targeting Countries. Bank of Japan Working
Papers Series.
Rigobon, R., 2003. Identification through heteroscedasticity. Rev. Econ. Stat. 85, 777–792.
Rigobon, R., Sack, B., 2003. Measuring the reaction of monetary policy to the stockmarket.
Q. J. Econ. 118, 639–669.
Rigobon, R., Sack, B., 2004. The impact of monetary policy on asset prices. J. Monet. Econ.
51, 1553–1575.
Sek, Siok Kun, 2008. “Interactions between Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate in Infla-
tion Targeting Emerging Countries: The Case of Three East Asian countries,” MPRA
Paper 12034. University Library of Munich, Germany.
Taylor, J., 2001. The role of the exchange rate in monetary policy rules. Am. Econ. Rev. 91,
263–267.
Taylor, J., 2002. The Monetary Transmission Mechanism and the Evaluation of Monetary
Policy Rules, First ed. Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series,
Monetary Policy: Rules and Transmission Mechanisms, 4, pp. 21–46.
Trichet, J.C., 2002. “Asset price bubbles and their implications for monetary policy and fi-
nancial stability”, Keynote address, Asset Price Bubbles conference held at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago, 23 April 2002. Central Bank Articles and Speeches.
